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Institute of Physiology II, Goethe University, D-60590 Frankfurt, GermanyIn her article on ethical implications of neuroscience,
Martha J. Farah suggests that growing knowledge about
the neural substrate of mental processes might undermine
our traditional (Cartesian?) understanding of personal
identity [1]. Is neuroscience on the road to showing that
character, consciousness and sense of spirituality are in
fact no more than ‘features of the machine’?
Importantly, the question of our individuality and
free will is a metaphysical problem, a problem that goes
beyond (meta) physics. If a neuroscientist says that we are
nothing else but ‘a pack of neurons’, he ceases to talk as an
empirical scientist and begins to talk as a philosopher
(though sometimes not being aware of it). Strong reduc-
tionism is a metaphysical point of view identifiable by the
typical slang that Julian Huxley called ‘nothingelsebuttery’.
There is a crucial difference between methodological
(scientific) and ontological (metaphysical) reductionism.
Reductionism is often a successful and therefore valuable
scientific method [2], allowing us to explain complex pro-
cesses in terms of more basic ones. However, if, even after
successful reductive attempts, an unexplained residuum
(for example ‘qualia’) remains, one should be careful to
jump to the conclusion that mental events are nothing but
neural states. From the fact that we can study psychic
phenomena using empirical methods it does not follow
that they are entirely reducible to lower ontological levels.
(Conversely, success of empirical research shows clearly
the inadequacy of ‘spiritualistic’ claims that the mind is
wholly inexplicable by science.)
Of course, one can believe that some day science will
come to a completely reductionistic and deterministic
picture of the world. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is
not empirically justified from present evidence. On the
contrary, several logical, empirical and philosophical
arguments have been put forward to support the idea
that consciousness is an emergent and indeterministic
phenomenon, possibly endowed with a ‘downwardcausation’ ability (e.g. [3–6]). Particularly worth noting
is a recent proposal of Jeffrey Satinover [7], which
interestingly combines novel findings in computational
neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics and quantum physics.
Satinover’s hypothesis of a hierarchy of nested networks
(reminiscent of Hofstadter’s ‘tangled hierarchy’ [8])
challenges the conventional wisdom that quantum
fluctuations are always self-averaging, and goes beyond
Penrose’s suggestions [6]. In fact, while rejecting strong
reductionism, one need not accept the dualism of body and
mind as two separate substances. The psychosomatic unity
of human beings suggests the possibility of seeing us as both
an inseparable and complementary union of mind and
matter.
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